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This submission establishes why a capable Defence Force is needed by outlining 
enduring features of the nature of international politics: 
 
 It remains an arena of competition and conflict, and even is war prone 
 Bad things happen, including surprises and the genuinely shocking 
 Uncertainty abounds 
 
It also explains why the character of the current strategic environment is not 
permissive of assumptions of peace and prosperity, due to both global and regional 
challenges: 
 
 Great power competition is growing 
 Russia and China, in particular, are dissatisfied powers 
 The United States remains global strategically preponderant but the 
international system is under significant strain 
 Australia’s interests are inexorably tied to the maintenance of the existing 
international system built around liberal principles, and we should contribute 
materially to its defence 
 In our own region China demonstrably is the primary source of instability and 
threat 
 Our region is undeniably a maritime one, and protection of the principles 
underpinning the international system as applied to the sea, such as freedom of 
navigation, must be protected 
 
It concludes by re-stating the benefits to Australia of pursuit of a maritime strategy 
capable of deterring or defeating threats as far from our own shores as possible. The 
force structure already outlined in previous white papers is largely sound, but needs to 
be fully implemented if the maritime strategy is to be effective.  
 
The Nature and Character of the International Political System 
 
Nature 
The Defence Issues Paper states that the answer to the question “Is war a thing of the 
past?” is now rather more obvious than it was at the turn of the century (p. 9). 
However, it would only be more obvious to those who suffer from the journalistic 
malady of “presentism”: the extrapolation of today’s international political and 
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strategic environment into the future with little expectation of change. As anyone with 
just a modicum of schooling in strategic history would know, the persistence of the 
social phenomenon of war is inherent in the international system, or more broadly, 
within or between organized political communities whether or not they take the form 
of the archetypical modern state.  
 
The objective of politics is power, and in the international arena, the influence over 
one’s external environment that power brings. Unlike the domestic politics of a 
democratic state, where political power is moderated by electoral politics and the rule 
of law, the international system is not so governed: there is no world government, no 
international equivalent of an electoral mechanism for allocating or negotiating 
political power, and no rule of law standing above politics to manage problems within 
the system. This is not to suggest that the international system is wretchedly chaotic 
or that states are constantly required to maintain a war footing for fear of the next 
imminent major threat. But it does explain why war is a constant feature of the 
international system. Competition and conflict are inherent features of politics, and in 
the absence of moderating mechanisms with in-built policing powers, the turn to 
organized violence or strategic coercion to settle disputes simply is an international 
fact of life. It is in the very nature of the politics of security: war and the coercive 
application of strategic power have been ever present phenomena across the history of 
human civilization. That fact pertained just as strongly in 2000 as it does in 2014, 
even though the specific character and identity of external threats are not constant 
over time. There is no convincing evidence today, as there was none in 2000, nor has 
there been at any time over the at least 2,500-year course of relatively well recorded 
human experience, that the scourge of war has been, or can be, consigned to the 
history books.  
 
Moreover, uncertainty – particularly about the unknowable future, which is, like war, 
another inescapable problem for policymakers – is another condition of international 
political life. The same can be said of surprises or shocks to the system. Negative 
events for security or stability that are unexpected and usually largely unpredictable in 
precise detail in advance in ways that allow for prevention of the shock in question, in 
actuality occur regularly. Take the following selection of candidate examples since 
the dying days of the Cold War: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the terrorist bombings of 
U.S. embassies in East Africa, the 9/11 attacks and the consequences, Russia’s 
invasions and annexations of parts of Georgia and the Ukraine, the global financial 
crisis, and the collapse of the Iraqi army in the face of the irregular rabble force of 
Sunni Islamist extremists commonly known as “Islamic State.” Not all surprises have 
negative consequences: for example, the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union was 
one of the more positive geopolitical events for international security during the 
twentieth century. It is also often easy to argue in hindsight that particular events 
should have been foreseen or could have been forestalled. Such arguments miss the 
point. The salient problem being identified is that for good or ill, political and 
strategic shocks to the system are relatively commonplace.  
 
Conflict, competition, coercion, the phenomenon of war, uncertainty, and shocks to 
the system simply are inherent in the very nature of world politics. Arguments 
frequently made that particular events could have been avoided, often using the 
dubious hindsight of the future historian, fail to acknowledge the more important, 
broader point: such problems are generic, in-built features of the international 
environment for policy and strategy makers. Such are the empirically grounded, albeit 
perhaps depressing, assumptions that need to underpin any review of defence policy 
and strategy.       
 
Character 
Unlike the unchanging nature of politics on the world scale, the character of the 
international security environment changes constantly, sometimes more frequently 
than at others, depending on political, strategic, economic, technological and other 
contexts in any one era. The particular character of the current international security 
environment, especially as it affects Australia, is neither one of imminent major 
strategic peril (although, as noted above, we don’t know today what shocks may occur 
tomorrow), but nor is it one in which we should hold too much confidence in our 
expectations for a peaceful and prosperous future, as we attempt to peer into the 
unknowable void that is the mid-century time frame required by planners of the future 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) in a Defence white paper process. Potential 
challenges that already are identifiable from current contexts can be discerned at both 
the global and regional scales. 
 
The Challenges Posed by the External Security Environment 
 
Global Challenges 
One leading current difficulty relates to the rise, decline and dissatisfaction of great 
powers in the system. These dynamic relationships have been in a period of flux since 
the end of the Cold War, characterized by the rise of China; the stuttering rise of 
India; the decline of Japan; despite some appearances to the contrary, the overall 
continued decline of Russia; the stagnation and likely decline over time of the 
geographical area we know as western Europe (to be sure not a polity, despite the best 
efforts of mostly unelected and unaccountable “Eurocrats,” but important on the 
world stage nonetheless); and the less confident leadership of a United States 
somewhat chastened by questionable strategic choices and performances during the 
two most recent administrations, a stumbling, unreformed economy and dysfunctional 
Congress. Yet the (self)perception of these powers and their interrelationships may be 
the most problematic aspect of great power intercourse at present, particularly when it 
comes to the continued dominant role of the United States, and the preference of 
certain powers for a return to a form of great power multipolarity, whether based upon 
well founded expectations or wishful thinking.  
 
Russia and China, in particular, may hope for a diminished global role for a 
supposedly relatively declining American super state, and an international status on a 
par with that of Washington. Their respective ambitions are unlikely to be fulfilled. 
Whilst trends are apt to change, the medium to longer term prospects for American 
power are at least as healthy, probably better, than those even of China. The portents 
for the underlying aspects of American power, including military power, its 
technology base and culture of innovation, its continued cultural and even ideological 
attractiveness, demography, and even its economy, with its strong resource base, 
including growing energy independence, seem to suggest, cumulatively, comparative 
strength on a global scale that other great powers are unlikely to be able to match. 
This expectation is clearly a positive factor for Australian security and should inform 
the way we shape policy, strategy and the future ADF. 
 
There is a related problem to great power machinations but one less well understood, 
however, which also has direct consequences for Australia. Australia is a beneficiary 
of, and active contributor to, the current world order organized around Western liberal 
principles. The international system became truly global only in the eighteenth 
century, symbolized by the global nature of the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), and 
“ordered” to the extent that that is possible by the leading sea power of the day, Great 
Britain. British leadership managed to defeat or deter illiberal threats to global order 
variously posed by French, Russian, and German authoritarian regimes. Its role 
serendipitously was usurped by another English-speaking liberal sea power of even 
greater reach and influence in the mid twentieth century: the United States, which led 
the liberal world’s efforts against both German and Soviet Russian twentieth century 
totalitarianism.  
 
U.S. preponderance in, and its implicit ordering role across the different geographical 
realms that make up the global commons, have been essential to the (relatively free) 
trade so important to global economic growth, to system protection, and thus also to 
wider international confidence in system stability. However, the system itself is 
threatened by any attempt to undermine the central U.S. role in it. System stability 
requires ordering power, and power, as is often observed, abhors a vacuum. Only 
through the deliberate application of fungible multidimensional capabilities of the 
world’s sole superpower can international confidence, and the prosperous and 
peaceable intercourse derived from it, be maintained. An ordering role cannot be 
generated by UN committee, for real power resides in the major states of the 
international system, not its organizations. Nor is the intellectually attractive but 
impracticable idea of a concert of powers especially feasible, and not solely because a 
concert could hardly be a club of equals given global U.S. preponderance. Even more 
important is that two members of any possible concert increasingly reject certain 
essential principles of the liberal order, such as freedom of navigation in the case of 
China (discussed further below), and administrative arrangements for an open, largely 
internationally uncontrolled, internet.  
 
Australia must understand that its stakes in the maintenance of a liberal world system 
are of the highest order of importance; simply put, it is essential to our own security 
and national interests. There is no viable alternative to the existing order; indeed, the 
most likely actual alternative would be a system which is far less orderly, and thus 
less economically prosperous and inherently more dangerous. The actions of certain 
previously named great power “stakeholders” not only increasingly demonstrate a 
lack of international responsibility, but positively seek to undermine the system. One 
of the most delicate geopolitical challenges for U.S. leadership given the dual 
aggression of Russia in Europe and clumsy assertiveness of China in Asia, is to not 
overreact to the extent that those two recalcitrant powers align together against U.S. 
and Western interests, and the international order as a whole. Australia’s most 
appropriate response is not, however, as some domestic commentators would have it, 
to act excessively pragmatically as if we were a disinterested party unwilling to cause 
offence to destabilizing parties, but to continue to actively support the extant 
international system through our alliance and coalition activities, as well as our 
broader diplomatic initiatives. An Australian grand strategy committed to system 
maintenance and a serious Australian contribution to it, including explicit ADF 
support to the deterrent effect generated by our primary ally, is a responsible position 
to take in defence of the very system that we rely upon. 
 
The problem of violent Islamist extremism is serious, albeit one which is of lesser 
consequence than great power challenges discussed above. The crisis within Islam 
arguably has been brewing for a century; it may take decades more to dissipate. There 
may be times when, as at present, modest ADF commitments may be made to 
coalition campaigns to combat a near-term threat to national or alliance interests, or to 
regional order in different parts of the world. In the main, though, much of the effort 
over time is likely to be non-military. Serious threats that do occasionally arise most 
likely can be dealt with by elements of the extant force, and should not be a primary 
driver of ADF development. 
 
Nor should so-called non-traditional security concerns drive the future shape of the 
Defence Force. If environmental or other problems cause crises requiring an ADF 
commitment, then it is well-equipped to do so relative to the overall modest size of 
the Defence Force, whether that involves non-combat contingencies such as 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, or even if the limited 
use of force is required. New capabilities such as the joint amphibious platforms 
(LHDs) and associated helicopters, and the Air Force’s improved fixed wing transport 
element, already are perfectly adapted to carry out such tasks. 
 
Another enduring global challenge is financial fragility. Few of the underlying 
problems which caused the global financial crisis have really been resolved, and 
economic weakness and debt abounds. Even Australia would struggle to effectively 
respond to a repeat crisis now that the surplus has been spent and deficit dominates. 
The implications are daunting: Defence spending will be excessively constrained due 
to ongoing deficits, yet should another crisis hit, such is the global fragility that 
currently exists, that conflict, and thus demand for ADF contributions to restore 
stability in individual failing states or regionally could rapidly expand.    
 
Regional Challenges 
Australia’s wider neighbourhood, the Indo-Pacific super-region, poses possibly 
greater challenges than does the global security environment as a whole. It is a vast 
area, geographically home to many political and strategic disputes. Most importantly, 
it is the centre of great power competition, largely focused on the threat posed by an 
unsatisfied, non-status quo China to adjacent countries and their friends and allies, 
and to those states dependent upon stability in, and trade with, Asia. Whilst the two 
conflicts involving one or more nuclear-armed powers, India-Pakistan in the west, and 
the Korean peninsula in the northeast, are perhaps the most inherently volatile and 
potentially dangerous, it should not be forgotten that China’s conflicts with other 
great powers also have a nuclear dimension. 
 
The Indo-Pacific is primarily a maritime region, whose seas carry a large proportion 
of world, and Australian, trade. It is the region’s maritime disputes that pose real risks 
for Australia: our trade could be directly disrupted or our economy indirectly 
negatively affected; our ally, friends and security partners could be attacked or 
otherwise drawn into armed conflict; or the region more generally destabilized. In 
fact, the latter risk is already, in practice, readily apparent. The problem, however, 
needs to be approached with clear vision, not myopically or euphemistically. Whilst it 
is true that there exist a number of different disputes involving a range of parties, the 
common factor to destabilization at sea is China. Absent China, for example, the 
South China Sea disputes would assuredly be more manageable, if not necessarily 
easily soluble. Thus, in terms of strategic risk, it can be misleading to euphemistically 
state that there exists a South China Sea problem, or an East China Sea problem, or 
even a Taiwan problem. In truth, clearly and succinctly stated, what the region is 
experiencing is in fact a China problem.     
 
It is fair to say that none of China’s maritime claims have a strong basis either in the 
historical record or international law (which is not to assume that other parties 
necessarily have valid claims either, especially in the South China Sea). But 
irrespective of such arguments, China’s highly coercive behaviour at sea (and in the 
air) is slowly changing the regional geopolitical status quo. Beijing unquestionably is 
in expansionist mode throughout East Asian seas, but in such a clumsy fashion that 
countervailing coalitions of states are beginning to form. Australia’s rapidly 
strengthening defence relationship with Japan, in the context of the trilateral dialogue 
also involving the United States, invariably is part of that process. This should be 
viewed as a positive Australian contribution to the regional order on which we 
depend, through the strengthening of deterrence of Chinese adventurism.  
 
China’s attempts to restrict freedom of navigation in its claimed exclusive economic 
zones and overflight of those zones is directly contrary to international conventions to 
which Beijing is a party. In practice, China is attempting to establish new 
international norms which would extend coastal state sovereignty over seas and 
airspace far beyond what is currently acceptable under international law. This is one 
of the ways by which China’s actions in East Asia link directly to world order, as 
these important regimes are global, not regional. If they are undermined regionally, 
they will be undermined globally, severely diminishing the extent of the global 
commons. It needs to be recognized that the U.S. alliance system, globally and 
regionally, is still a maritime one, heavily dependent upon access to the seas, as well 
as to the other commons environments of international airspace, space and 
cyberspace. The ability of the United States and its allies to both defend and exploit 
those commons strategically underpins the extant world order. This is unassailably a 
direct strategic interest for Australia.  
 
It certainly is possible that Australia could be drawn into an armed conflict involving 
China, whether in response to a direct attack upon a close friend and fellow 
democracy such as Japan, or less directly, should U.S. forces be attacked whilst 
fulfilling America’s own alliance commitments. If such an attack were to occur in the 
western Pacific, it would likely trigger an expectation of an ANZUS Treaty 
commitment on the part of Australia. These risks are worth running if aggression is to 
be deterred, or defeated, should deterrence fail. The 2009 white paper established the 
central problem of China as well as it could without being gratuitously provocative. 
Predictably, Chinese, and the pro-China lobby’s pressure ensured that the issue was 
fudged in the 2013 iteration to the point of misleading the public. That was 
regrettable, for it is essential in a liberal democracy that defence policy speaks openly 
and honestly about threats to our national interests. Economic relationships may be 
important, but fundamental political and strategic interests should trump mere 
commerce every time. 
 
It is also worth noting that unlike the portents for America over the medium to longer 
term, those for China may be mixed at best. A myriad of domestic problems from 
political rigidity and lack of the rule of law and a range of freedoms, fissiparous 
ethno-territorial tendencies in large western regions of its non-Han empire, endemic 
corruption, debt and economic stagnation, environmental degradation, bad 
demography, and so on could wreck China’s continued rise. If one engages with the 
metaphor of the dynastic cycle solely for illustrative purposes, it is not at all clear 
where on the cycle China currently is situated. The future could just as easily bring 
decline as it could further ascent.   
 
Implications for the ADF 
 
The 2009 white paper established a strong case for an expanded maritime capability, 
which would allow the joint force to operate throughout the vast arc of the Indo-
Pacific from the western Indian Ocean through the Eastern Archipelago to Northeast 
Asia. That was a sensible and realistic approach to our geostrategic circumstances 
and, despite the diplomatic fudging of 2013, that white paper continued the 
commitment to the substantive force structure improvements set out in 2009.  
 
Maritime strategy is at its most effective and beneficial when it is designed to be able 
to meet and defeat threats as far from national territory as possible. Australia’s 
maritime geography is sympathetically configured for the design and implementation 
of effective maritime strategy. This will require that the posited force of long-range 
and high-endurance platforms capable of operating throughout the Indo-Pacific region 
actually is constructed. The one significant limitation to the plan remains the Air 
Force’s contribution, given the relatively short range and limited endurance of its 
combat aircraft. For the joint force to be fully effective there seems to be an 
assumption that access to friendly and useable air bases sufficiently close to likely 
theatres of operation will be available. That may be an heroic assumption. 
 
Other challenges for the ADF remain the successful integration of new capabilities 
currently under construction, plus selection of a new submarine design. There is one 
point to be made on the latter problem. Whichever design ultimately is chosen, it must 
be of sufficiently long range and high endurance to suit our unique requirements, and 
it must be built around the U.S. combat system. As with all major advanced combat 
platforms, space and intelligence-gathering assets, it is politically, strategically and 
technologically essential that we are able to be fully interoperable with our primary 
ally. American systems must therefore lie at the heart of all of our most sophisticated 
defence needs.  
 
Finally, a useful addition to the 2015 white paper would be an explanation of how the 
joint maritime force currently under development can/will be employed strategically 
to protect the important national interests as set out in foreign and defence policy. It 
would be preferable if it could outline the types of generic operations within our 
specific Indo-Pacific geography that the ADF should be able to conduct.   
 
 
